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MAYLE v. FELIX 
ALEKSANDRA KOPEC* 
In a 7-2 decision,1 the United States Supreme Court refused the 
right of a prisoner to amend his habeas petition because his amended 
petition failed to meet the one-year deadline imposed by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).2 
The Court considered Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2)3 in 
determining whether the amended pleading related back to the 
original pleading, and thus did not violate the AEDPA time 
limitation. The Supreme Court found the two pleadings too remote in 
time and scope to be reasonably related, and thus held that the 
AEDPA limitation barred the second claim. 
Jacoby Felix was convicted of first degree murder and second 
degree robbery in California state court and received a life sentence 
for the two offenses.4 Felix subsequently filed a pro se habeas petition 
in federal court within the one-year AEDPA limit.5 The petition 
alleged that videotaped testimony admitted into evidence by a 
prosecution witness violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause.6 After Felix received appointed counsel, his 
attorney filed an amended petition, but it was already five months 
past the AEDPA deadline.7 The amended petition alleged that pretrial 
interrogation by the police coerced Felix to make damaging 
admissions. It further alleged that those admissions should have been 
 
 * 2007 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Mayle v. Felix, 125 S. Ct. 2562 (2005). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2005) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
State court.”). 
 3. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(2) (“An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the 
original pleading when . . . (2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out 
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading.”). 
 4. Mayle, 125 S. Ct. at 2566. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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excluded from trial because they were obtained in violation of Felix’s 
Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. The 
district court dismissed the amended claim as time-barred and 
rejected the original claim on its merits.8 However, although the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the original claim, it 
reversed the dismissal of the amended petition.9 To reach this 
conclusion, the court interpreted the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
15(c)(2) requirements broadly. It found that the amended petition 
related back to the original because it “arose out of the same conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth in his original pleading—namely, 
his state trial and conviction.”10 The Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the Ninth Circuit, and interpreted the rule more 
narrowly.11 
Justice Ginsburg wrote for the seven member majority of the 
Court, emphasizing that the AEDPA was enacted to limit the time for 
collateral attacks in habeas petitions. The opinion also stressed the 
congressional intent to hasten the finality of criminal proceedings12 
and the special rules that govern habeas cases.13 The opinion noted 
that Habeas Corpus Rule 11 was particularly applicable because it 
allowed application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “to the 
extent that [the civil procedure rules] are not inconsistent with any 
statutory provisions or [the habeas] rules.”14 The former prescription 
was an important qualification for the majority’s rationale, as it 
indicated the supremacy of the AEDPA over Rule 15(c)(2). 
According to the habeas rules, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
15(c)(2) could only be applied if it were consistent with a statutory 
provision, such as the AEDPA. 
The opinion analyzed the relationship between Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8(a)15 and Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c), emphasizing that 
Rule 8(a) required only that an adequately grounded complaint 
 
 8. Id. at 2568. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Felix v. Mayle, 379 F.3d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 11. Mayle, 125 S. Ct. at 2575. 
 12. Id. at 2569. 
 13. R. Governing Section 2254 Cases. 
 14. See id. 
 15. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 8(a) (“A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain 
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends . . . 
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) 
a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.”). 
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provide fair notice,16 while the habeas rules required that a “petition 
must: (1) specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner; 
[and] (2) state the facts supporting each ground.”17 The majority 
determined the rules required that each claim for relief be specifically 
stated and, therefore, that no general claim can later be amended. 
Combing these linguistic interpretations for practical application, 
the Supreme Court noted that a majority of federal circuit courts had 
defined the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” standard under 
Rule 15(c)(2) narrowly. The Ninth and Seventh Circuits were in the 
minority, taking the opposite view.18 The Supreme Court feared that 
this minority view, espousing broad interpretation of Rule 15(c)(2), 
could imply that any amended petition would pass the test, provided 
it related to the same trial, conviction, or sentence. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court agreed with the majority of the circuits, concluding 
that “Rule 15(c)(2) relaxes, but does not obliterate, the statute of 
limitations; hence relation back depends on the existence of a 
common ‘core of operative facts’ uniting the original and newly 
asserted claims.”19 
The Court rejected Felix’s argument that the decision concerning 
his amended pleading should parallel the permissive interpretation of 
the relation-back doctrine adopted in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line 
Railroad Co.20 There, the Court allowed a widow whose husband had 
been killed in a railroad accident to amend her complaint in the same 
cause of action.21 Personal injury, according to the majority, arises 
from one circumstance. Therefore, it reasoned, pleadings related to 
that one circumstance all relate back to the same “conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence.”22 However, Felix targeted a separate 
episode, specifically the self-incrimination claim that occurred outside 
 
 16. Id. at 2570. 
 17. R. Governing Section 2254 Cases 2(c) (form of petition). 
 18. See id. at 2570. 
 19. Id. at 2572. 
 20. Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 574 (1945). 
 21. Id. (finding that a widow’s subsequent statutory claim for failure to provide locomotive 
with a rear light fell under the Rule 15(c)(2) same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” 
standard as the initial negligence claim against the railroad company because these both arose 
from one personal injury circumstance). 
 22. See Mayle, 125 S. Ct. at 2572. 
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the scope of the trial. Under this reasoning, the majority reversed the 
Ninth Circuit and rejected Felix’s habeas petition. 
The dissent, authored by Justice Souter and joined by Justice 
Stevens, argued that Felix’s amended claim should have been allowed. 
The two justices argued that the AEDPA should be qualified by Rule 
15(c)(2) and should not be the sole authority on timing for amended 
claims.23 Furthermore, the dissent stated that Felix was correct to 
assert that both petitions related back to the same conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence. According to the dissent, the original claim 
and the amended claim were the same in the following two respects: 
(i) they both related to conduct addressed at the same trial, and (ii) 
they both involved the same judge, parties and attorneys, courtroom, 
and jurors.24 Thus, the two claims equally depended on the specified 
trial errors. 
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s assertion that most 
circuit cases did not support Felix’s view. According to the minority, 
the circuit cases “simply [stood] for the proposition that an 
amendment relates back only if it deals with the same conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence.”25 Therefore, the dissent reasoned, the 
same conduct, transaction, or occurrence can support multiple claims. 
In that vein, the dissent embraced the broader interpretation of Rule 
15(c)(2) to permit Felix’s amended petition. This interpretation may 
be seen as similar to the reasoning employed by the Court in Tiller. 
The dissent emphasized that in Tiller the relation-back doctrine was 
extended to allow an amendment that raised a separate claim out of 
the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim.26 If Congress 
had wanted to limit the rights of habeas petitioners to amend their 
complaints, it would have done so explicitly, as it had in other 
circumstances.27 
The dissent’s policy considerations provided the most compelling 
argument. The opinion highlighted the practical implications of a 
 
 23. Id. at 2576 (“AEDPA’s objectives bear little weight in the analysis, because the very 
point of every relation back rule is to qualify a statute of limitations.”). 
 24. Id. at 2577. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Tiller, 323 U.S. at 581 (finding that the two pleadings related back because they arose 
out of the same general conduct that caused the death of the plaintiff’s now deceased husband). 
 27. Mayle, 125 S. Ct. at 2580 (citing the explicit limits placed on habeas petitioners subject 
to capital sentences in certain states). 
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narrow interpretation of Rule 15(c)(2). In many cases, the dissent 
reasoned, the original habeas petition is the work of a pro se 
petitioner, and in ninety-three percent of cases, counsel is appointed 
after this petition has been filed.28 Limiting the right to amend habeas 
petitions may therefore disproportionately disadvantage indigent 
habeas petitioners who often receive counsel late in their habeas 
proceedings.29 
The dissent’s policy arguments seem more compelling than the 
rationale proposed by the majority. The practical implications of the 
majority’s interpretation propose a serious problem for indigent 
petitioners. If indigent petitioners do not have access to counsel when 
filing their initial habeas petitions, the limits placed on the 
opportunity to amend these original petitions should be more lenient 
than the Supreme Court has required. Otherwise, indigent petitioners 
will be highly disadvantaged. Petitioners are often unaware of the 
constitutional claims they may raise in habeas petitions. As the dissent 
emphasized, when counsel is appointed, the attorney should be 
permitted to provide the full extent of legal advice such that habeas 
petitions may be amended and new claims legitimately added.30 A 
petitioner should not be limited in working with his counsel on 
subsequent habeas claims when his initial habeas petition has 
survived judicial review.31 
The conflict between the meaning of the law and its effects in 
practice permeated the discussion. Rather than limit its consideration 
to the implications of Rule 15(c)(2) on an individual level, as did the 
dissent, the majority considered the Rule’s implications on a broader 
scale. Although the dissent’s argument can be universalized in the 
sense that far more constitutional claims go unnoticed for each 
indigent petitioner forbidden to file an additional claim, the majority 
 
 28. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 191 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Habeas Corpus Review: 
Challenging State Court Criminal Convictions 14 (1995)); cf. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics Special Report: Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases (2000), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bsj/pub/pdf.dccc.pdf. 
 29. Mayle, 125 S. Ct. at 2581–82. 
 30. See id. at 2581 (“For by hobbling counsel this way, the Court limits the capacity of 
appointed counsel to provide the professional service that a paid lawyer, hired at the outset, can 
give a client.”). 
 31. Id. 
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focused more on the wide societal and pragmatic implications of the 
holding. For instance, the majority’s narrow interpretation of the rule 
serves to alleviate already overcrowded court dockets. However, this 
may not be a real concern for habeas proceedings. The total number 
of habeas petitions filed by prisoners in United States district courts 
has declined since 2000, though the numbers have increased since the 
enactment of AEDPA in 1996.32 
The narrow interpretation that the majority embraced may also 
ensure that the AEDPA continues to affect habeas proceedings. The 
dissent’s approach may have weakened the AEDPA by allowing a 
large number of amended petitions after the statute of limitations had 
passed. Furthermore, the dissent’s interpretation may even have 
invalidated Rule 15(c)(2) altogether. A broad interpretation of the 
same conduct, transaction, or occurrence could effectively nullify the 
standard. Had Congress wanted such a lax, ineffectual standard for 
Rule 15(c)(2), it may not have passed a separate provision of the 
federal procedural rules. 
Finally, the majority’s emphasis on Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c)33 was 
key to its decision. Because the rule requires specificity when stating 
habeas claims, it aids in facilitating criminal proceedings. Petitioners 
must specify all grounds for a claim in the original pleading. Thus, the 
majority’s interpretation emphasizes the importance of not only this 
habeas rule, but also of efficient criminal proceedings. And, as noted 
previously, the majority followed the view held by a majority of circuit 
courts. Thus, the Supreme Court confirmed a trend already embraced 
by the lower courts. 
Although the dissent’s policy arguments presented a compelling 
reason to interpret Rule 15(c)(2) broadly, the majority based its 
reasoning on a logical combination of the civil procedure rule with 
the AEDPA and the general habeas rules. If the policy concerns prove 
to be as dire as the dissent argued, Congress can change the way that 
habeas petitions may be amended via legislation. Notably, the 
dissent’s fairness argument did not apply to the facts in Felix. As the 
majority pointed out, “[t]he concern is understandable, although we 
note that in Felix’s case, counsel was appointed, and had some two 
 
 32. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 
2.9, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table2.09.pdf. 
 33. R. Governing Section 2254 Cases. 
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and a half months to amend the petition before AEDPA’s limitation 
period expired.”34 It is possible, however, that the Court would have 
been willing to take a more liberal view of the rule for a petitioner 
who was denied access to counsel after the AEDPA statute of 
limitations expired, a situation the Court may yet face. For now, the 
majority’s interpretation is a reasonable one. Felix’s amended habeas 
petition was rightly denied as time barred because the subsequent 
amended petition did not properly relate back to the same conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence. 
 
 
 34. Mayle, 125 S. Ct. at 2575. 
